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3 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]  
Deputy Director, Office of External Affairs

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FROM:

[redacted]  
Acting Director, Intelligence Community Staff

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SUBJECT:

Community Comments on Senator Huddleston Report  
[redacted]

25X1

REFERENCE:

[redacted], dated 24 August 1982

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1. As requested in reference, comments have been provided to this staff from Department of State, Director INR; the Assistant Director Intelligence Division, FBI; Acting Director, DIA; and Deputy Director, NSA regarding the Huddleston reports.

2. Also provided by the Chairman of COMIREX is a detailed commentary concerning aspects of the [redacted] program noted in the Senator's report. While this material may be excerpted in the course of consolidating the various inputs, it is important that the major points made and pertinent background information provided by O/ICE, be transmitted to the Senator.

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[redacted] O/ICE/ICS (Secure x-1261), who prepared the commentary, can provide assistance if needed.

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[redacted] 25X1

## Attachments:

- A. Department of State, D/INR Comments
- B. FBI Comments
- C. DIA Comments
- D. NSA Comments
- E. COMIREX Comments

[redacted] 25X1

SUBJECT: Community Comments on Senator Huddleston Report  
on [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(3 September 1982)

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ATTACHMENT A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John E. Koehler  
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Comments on Senator Huddleston's  
Report to SSCI

John,

I have read Senator Huddleston's report and found it full of perceptive insights into US intelligence policy regarding Israel. It highlights several aspects of this mutually beneficial relationship that deserve thoughtful study. I am thinking in this regard of the Senator's recommendation to do more to exploit liaison channels, as well as his comments on the sharing of imagery and the larger question of collection on Israel as a target in its own right.

On the matter of intentions vs capabilities (p.41), I was struck by the report's assertion that "the task of estimating leadership intentions is mainly an analytical problem, based on an assessment of individual personalities." To be sure, fathoming intentions is an analytical challenge of a high order, and the personalities of leaders play a key role. Nevertheless, it seems to me, personalities are only part of the picture and, in a democracy, frequently a less important one. Equally as important in making predictions in the case of the invasion of Lebanon may be such factors as the record of previous actions by the Israeli government, our assessment of Israeli political dynamics, the perception of what the US would or would not tolerate and a host of other complex calculations that presumably led the Israelis to move when they did and eventually to go considerably beyond the 40 kilometers they mentioned initially in connection with the "Peace in Galilee" operation.

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I also found (p.43) some confusion in the report on overt collection. Most US intelligence on Israel comes from HUMINT, which presumably includes both overt and covert collection. Embassy reporting, as the Senator notes, indeed is a primary source. FBIS coverage of what the Israelis are saying obviously is important. But two comments attributed to a CIA analyst in connection with an assessment of Israeli intentions to invade Lebanon do not do justice to the scope and detail of Embassy reporting. We had far more to go on than FBIS: attache reporting, cables from Sam Lewis and others, etc., in addition to coverage of northern Israel by imagery. I can only conclude, therefore, that Senator Huddleston may not have been fully aware of the quality and quantity of the Mission's reporting, specifically of NODIS, STADIS and EXDIS traffic, in addition to technical sources of information.

As you know, intelligence analysts rely very heavily on Embassy reporting as an intelligence source. Even though many of our Foreign Service colleagues may not view themselves as HUMINT collectors in this sense, I've often heard the assertion from Bob Inman and others that "about 50 percent of the items in the NID" are based on State Department cables, and I believe it.

I hope these comments give you some grist for the IC reply to Senator Huddleston's commendable effort to enlighten the Committee on this very special relationship. If you need more, please let me know.

  
Hugh Montgomery

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ATTACHMENT C

DIA COMMENTS

1. (S/NF) Senator Huddleston's comments in the report with respect to seeming contradictions in U.S. liaison and collection policies do, in our view, have some validity. Exchange restrictions with Israel tend to occur or develop during periods of international crisis. We are in such a period currently. Intelligence and service relationships tend to survive such periods over time.
2. (S/NF/WNINTEL) With respect to the liaison arrangements concerning exchange of Soviet weapons, as discussed on page 2 of the report, the Secretary of Defense has established a DoD-wide effort to study the military lessons that can be learned from the Lebanon conflict. A study plan for this effort has been formulated and a study team designated. It is anticipated that the study team will be sent in-country once the Beirut situation is resolved and political policy toward Israel determined.
3. (S/NF) Note is taken of the comments concerning sharing of imagery (page 5) and by the Israelis concerning early warning and the general policy question of sharing of imagery (pp. 9,23). In this regard, we feel that the Israelis are and will increase pressure on us for direct access to satellite photography and that provocative overflights of Arab territory will continue inasmuch as they serve both their intelligence and political interests. The Israelis naturally want the best and most complete intelligence they can get. Conversely, it is our belief that their existing assets are sufficient to provide warning of the threat of serious hostilities.
4. (S/NF) Concerning the remarks about contacts between the respective military attaches and officials of host governments, the degree of Israeli contact with U.S. intelligence officials in Washington is greater than the degree of U.S. contact in Tel Aviv. This is a subject of great concern to DIA.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

SENSITIVE

Serial: N1003  
3 September 1982


MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SUBJECT: Report of Senator Huddleston to the Senate Select  
Committee on Intelligence (U)

1. (TSC-NF) As requested in your 26 August Memorandum, we have reviewed the reports covering Senator Huddleston's trip to Israel and our comments are attached. We believe that some special treatment should be given to "retrenchment," a topic which appears at several points in the reports.

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4. (U) If you have questions about our attached comments, please let us know.



LINCOLN D. FAURER  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:  
a/s

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY COMMENTS  
ON  
SENATOR HUDDLESTON'S REPORT TO THE SSCI ON ISRAEL (TSC-NF)

(TSC-NF) The following comments, keyed to pertinent pages of the report, are meant to clarify Senator Huddleston's understanding and perceptions of [REDACTED]

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(U) Page 4. RETRENCHMENT. Please see the comments provided at paragraph 2 of the cover.

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(SC-NF) Page 9. "UPS AND DOWNS" REGARDING COMINT. We do not know the meaning of General Ya'ari's comment. It could relate to their loss of Egyptian coverage after the Sinai withdrawal.

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